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The Sharing Economy and related platform technologies have 
disrupted work, consumption, and business in ways unimaginable 
even a decade ago. Creating great wealth and opportunity for some, 
the Sharing Economy has equally undermined job security and 
safety for many others. One challenge for regulators, legal advisors, 
and scholars is developing a rigorous analytical model for these re-
lated phenomena. We present the first comprehensive legal frame-
work for distinguishing and analyzing the various components of the 
Sharing Economy and their interrelationships. Our analysis is 
based on contract law and property law, providing a delimitation 
within the Sharing Economy and platform technologies based on le-
gal categories. Our approach provides a foundation for analytical 
rigor that has been absent to date. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Sharing Economy is one of the most important social, eco-
nomic, and legal phenomena in the world today. Yet there is no gen-
erally accepted definition of this phenomenon. A variety of terms 
are used to describe it, including the “Sharing Economy,” “Crowd-
Based Capitalism,” “Collaborative Consumption,” “Gig Economy,” 
and “The Mesh.”1 It represents a new type of behavior and practice 
 
1 “Sharing Economy” is the most accepted term to denominate this phenomenon. See 
Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification 
Fights, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 n.1 (2018) (providing empirical evidence 
about why the term “Sharing Economy” has been the dominant term used to describe the 
phenomenon); Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 526 n. 85 (2016) 
(arguing that “the term ‘sharing economy’ appears to be the de facto term being used by 
regulators and policymakers, as well as the media and the companies themselves.”); Chris 
J. Martin, The Sharing Economy: A Pathway to Sustainability or a Nightmarish Form of 
Neoliberal Capitalism?, 121 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 149, 151 (2016) (concluding that the 
Sharing Economy has become the predominant concept). However, other terms have been 
proposed, such as: (1) Collaborative Consumption, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, 
WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); (2) 
Collaborative Economy, e.g., Resolution on a European Agenda for the Collaborative 
Economy, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM P8_TA(2017)0271) (2017); (3) Crowd-Based 
Capitalism, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016); (4) the Mesh, e.g., LISA 
GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING (2010); (5) Peer-to-Peer 
Market, e.g., Liran Einav et al., Peer-to-Peer Markets, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 615 (2016); (6) 
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that is rapidly spreading and massively disrupting established busi-
ness practices, business models, and regulatory frameworks around 
the globe.2 At a most basic level, the Sharing Economy is facilitated 
by a new technology where one party provides goods and services 
(“Provider”) to another party (“User”) using an online platform op-
erated by a third party (“Platform Operator”).3 This new technology 
creates many innovation opportunities for new business models as 
well as a new set of legal relations, a new legal structure or model. 
In this Article, this new legal structure or model is referred to as the 
‘PUP model’ (Platform operator-User-Provider model). 
Prior scholarship has conflated several distinct phenomena—
lumping together different economies with technologies and 
 
Peer-to-Peer Economy or P2P Economy, e.g., Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal 
Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 1, 5 (2012); (7) Peer-to-Peer 
Consumption, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 989, 991 (2016); (8) Disaggregation Economy, e.g., Daniel E. Rauch & David 
Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of 
the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015); (9) Access-Based Consumption, e.g., 
Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car 
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881 (2012); (10) Gig Economy, e.g., Valerio De Stefano, 
The Rise of the Just-in-Time Workforce: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor 
Protection in the Gig-Economy, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471 (2016); (11) Platform 
Economy, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); (12) 
On-Demand Economy, e.g., Daniel G. Cockayne, Sharing and Neoliberal Discourse: The 
Economic Function of Sharing in the Digital On-Demand Economy, 77 GEOFORUM 73 
(2016); (13) 1099 Economy, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Agency Law and the New 
Economy, 72 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1010 n. 2 (2017); (14) Ubernomics, e.g., Michael Motala, 
The “Taxi Cab Problem” Revisited: Law and Ubernomics in the Sharing Economy, 31 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 467 (2016); (15) Bit Economy, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, 
Regulation of Share Economy: A Consistently Changing Environment, in DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE 89, 91 (Reiner Schulze & 
Dirk Staudenmayer eds., 2016); (16) Participatory Consumption, e.g., Opinion of the 
European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Collaborative or Participatory 
Consumption, a Sustainability Model for the 21st Century’, EUR. ECON. & SOC. COMM. 
(2014/C 177/01) (2014); (17) Relationship Economy, e.g., JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW 
IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISES, 
AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (2012); (18) Cooperative Economy, e.g., id.; (19) 
Grassroots Economy, e.g., id.; (20) New Economy, e.g., id.; (21) Leasing, Subleasing, or 
Licensing Economy, e.g., Gregory M. Stein, Inequality in the Sharing Economy, 85 
BROOK. L. REV. 787, 796 (2020); and (22) ‘Go-it-Alone’ Economy, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel, 
Pooling and Unpooling in the Uber Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 286 (2017). 
2 Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 31, 32–34 (2016). 
3 See infra Part I – Theoretical Context. 
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business models. The judiciary, unsurprisingly primarily American, 
has in turn struggled to understand the various phenomena under 
consideration. Because of this, uncertainty has emerged in the 
American legal system and beyond.4 The lack of appropriate cate-
gories has destabilized the law in and around the use of the PUP 
model.5 
Accordingly, creating a legal definition and an analytical frame-
work of the Sharing Economy in the first instance is of paramount 
concern. Defining the Sharing Economy—a term which we believe 
is of limited use—provides the foundation for an analytical frame-
work. Once we have established this broader framework, we believe 
that we are better able to understand, locate, and analyze the nature 
and activities of the PUP model. In other words, a legal analysis of 
the PUP model and its subclasses goes hand in hand with a legal 
analysis of the Sharing Economy, the Access Economy, the Gift 
Economy, and the Exchange Economy. The definitions of these cat-
egories are of paramount concern, allowing a more precise analysis 
and foundation on which future regulation can be based.6 
This Article provides a framework for analyzing the PUP model 
and its subclasses, and places them in the context of the four econo-
mies to facilitate their legal analysis. The Article pursues this aim in 
four main parts. The theoretical context of the definition of the 
 
4 Compare O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(holding that plaintiffs, Uber drivers, were Uber’s presumptive employees) with Lawson 
v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (categorising the plaintiff, a 
Grubhub delivery person, as an independent contractor of this company). Rashmi Dyal-
Chand has explained that “[r]egulators have responded to the new business models 
proliferating in the sharing economy with a mixture of confusion, indignation, and alarm. 
In general, regulations have been reactive and piecemeal, rather than proactive or 
comprehensive. At times, regulators in different states and at the federal level have treated 
the same business practices quite differently. Often, in their haste to protect some market 
participants, they have ignored the needs of others.” RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, 
COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET 
REGULATIONS  193 (2018). 
5 As Judge Logue said in McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, “we must 
decide whether a multi-faceted product of new technology should be fixed into either the 
old square hole or the old round hole of existing legal categories, when neither is a perfect 
fit.” 210 So. 3d 220, 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
6 See Zale, supra note 1, at 510 (arguing that “[d]eveloping a conceptual framework to 
ground the discourse about the sharing economy is critical from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective.”). 
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Sharing Economy is revisited and expanded upon in Part I. This part 
explores the ambiguity in the concept of the Sharing Economy and 
the problems this has posed from the point of view of legal catego-
ries. Part II provides the theoretical foundation in property law and 
contract law that is used throughout the Article. Part III includes a 
semantic and legal analysis of the terms sharing and economy, 
providing guidance for the next part of the Article. Part IV, the crux 
of the Article, proposes a legal definition of the phenomenon. 
 
I. THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
At its core, the Sharing Economy allows the creation of a busi-
ness model where Platform Operators aggregate supply and demand 
via an interactive network, providing opportunity for people and 
businesses to meet their needs and put inactive assets or time into 
economic productivity.7 For instance, Uber aggregates information 
from Uber drivers (Providers) and Uber passengers (Users) through 
its platform and matches supply and demand for transportation ser-
vices. Uber drivers, in turn, harness the idle capacity of their vehi-
cles by providing these services.  
The Platform Operators aggregate previously disaggregated in-
formation, consolidate it, and form a market which in turn they tar-
get to a larger audience: Users.8 This technology is successfully  
exploited by companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit.9  
A number of significant claims have been made about it, including 
changes in the economy and the creation of new economies, often 
denominated the ‘Sharing Economy.’ 
Since the beginning of the Sharing Economy,10 the economy and 
society have been affected in a multitude of ways, both positively 
 
7 Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 917.  
8 Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. 
ON LEG. 147, 164 (2016). 
9 Id. at 149. 
10 The beginning of the “Sharing Economy” can be traced back to the Global Financial 
Crisis when the sharing firms Airbnb (2008) and Uber (2009) emerged, and the term 
“Sharing Economy” was first mentioned (2008). See Lobel, supra note 1, at 94 (arguing 
that “while the timeline is not set in stone, it is useful to mark 2008, with the founding of 
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and negatively. On the positive side, the Sharing Economy has cre-
ated wealth,11 job opportunities,12 supplementary income, 13 flexi-
bility,14 inclusion,15 and a broader variety of services and products 
for consumers.16 On the other hand, the Sharing Economy has 
 
Airbnb as the rise of the new wave of the platform—a stunning number of fast-growing of 
algorithm-enabled cyber-places where constituents transact.”); Thomas Puschmann & 
Rainer Alt, Sharing Economy, 58 BUS. INFO. SYS. ENG’G 93, 95 (2016) (contending that 
the term “Sharing Economy” was first mentioned by Lawrence Lessig in his 2008 book 
Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy); Inara Scott & Elizabeth 
Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 553, 
558 n.21 (2017) (explaining that even though Martin Weitzman wrote a book titled The 
Share Economy in 1984, this work is not about the phenomenon of the “Sharing Economy” 
being analyzed). 
11 PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that the total global revenues from five Sharing 
Economy sectors―travel, car sharing, finance, staffing, and music and video streaming―
will increase from $15 billion to around $35 billion by 2025. 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SHARING ECONOMY 1, 14, available at https://www.pw 
c.fr/fr/assets/files/pdf/2015/05/pwc_etude_sharing_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/S926-
NRJV]. 
12 See, e.g., Shep Hyken, The Gig Economy Opens the Door for Employment 
Opportunities, FORBES (July 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/2018/07
/29/the-gig-economy-opens-the-door-for-employment-opportunities/#7f8ca9567662 
[https://perma.cc/E7VV-S4PT]. 
13 See, e.g., Ruth Fowler, The Reluctant Airbnb Host: Why I Rent My Spare Bedroom to 
Pay My Own Rent, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technol
ogy/2017/aug/01/airbnb-host-rent-housing-crisis-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/6HHR-
W8ZJ]; see also John Collet, More Australians Boost Their Income Through the Sharing 
Economy, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 1, 2018), https://www.smh.com.au/money/pl
anning-and-budgeting/more-australians-boost-their-income-through-the-sharing-
economy-20180427-p4zc25.html [https://perma.cc/JG23-FFBK]. 
14    See, e.g., S. Kumar, 3 Reasons to Cheer Uber and the Sharing Economy, FORTUNE 
(July 20, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/20/uber-and-the-sharing-economy/ 
[https://perma.cc/8N7W-JXLH]. 
15 See, e.g., Sam Levin, Airbnb Vows to be First Company to Defy Trump and Keep 
Employing Dreamers, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/sep/07/silicon-valley-executives-dreamers-daca-trump 
[https://perma.cc/X2TQ-KK9J]. 
16 See, e.g., Suzanne Bearne, The Sharing Economy: A Money-Making Space Made for 
Startups, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-
network/2015/apr/08/sharing-economy-startups-airbnb-business [https://perma.cc/ZU34-
ZUQ4]. 
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facilitated murder,17 rape,18 suicide,19 discrimination,20 fraud,21 low 
wages, job insecurity,22 and other negative effects.23 
The term “Sharing Economy” draws upon ideas of altruistic be-
havior in daily life.24 One can think of an example where a person 
may pick up a coworker to share the drive to work. There is nothing 
unique or special about this activity. It is simply a demonstration of 
altruism, generosity, and collaboration. What is significant in the 
absence of the technologically facilitated Sharing Economy is that 
the behavior is limited to two people acting in a personal, non-com-
mercial context. The car owner is using private resources while the 
coworker is not looking for a commercial arrangement but is relying 
on personal goodwill. While a change in the behavior—such that it 
becomes a regular event—may lead the coworker to offer some 
money to offset the costs of operating the vehicle, it remains funda-
mentally a personal, non-commercial arrangement. What then shifts 
 
17 See, e.g., Emma Younger, Airbnb Murder Accused Placed Guest in Headlock After 
Dispute Over Rent, Court Told, ABC (May 22, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-
05-22/ramis-jonuzi-melbourne-airbnb-guest-death-brighton-east-court/9787996 
[https://perma.cc/X6GB-H3J8]. 
18 See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Uber Driver Convicted of Raping Female Passenger, 




19 See, e.g., Tyler Pager & Emily Palmer, Uber Driver’s Death Marks Seventh For-
Hire Driver Suicide Within a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/07/nyregion/uber-driver-suicide-for-hire-taxis-new-york.html 
[https://perma.cc/EZW7-VZRA]. 
20 See, e.g., Elaine Glusac, As Airbnb Grows, so do Claims of Discrimination, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/travel/airbnb-
discrimination-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/V7PP-9TMQ]. 
21 See, e.g., Rebecca Smithers, I Was Conned by a Fraudster Pretending to Be an 
Airbnb Host, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/
may/08/conned-by-fraudster-airbnb-host [https://perma.cc/4VAC-2EY8]. 
22 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, False Freedom: Sharing the Scraps from the Perilous 
Gig Economy, LITERARY HUB (Aug. 7, 2019), https://lithub.com/false-freedom-sharing-
the-scraps-from-the-perilous-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/4QQV-H52E]. 
23 See Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 309, 311 (2016) (contrasting the  arguments supporting the conventional narrative 
and the counternarrative of the Sharing Economy). 
24 See Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for 
Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 197 (2017).  
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with the introduction of the PUP model? And further, when does it 
shift? 
The critical factor disrupting these traditional relationships is a 
technological innovation: the development of the internet-based 
platforms. These platforms create a much wider web of interactivity 
providing an opportunity for people to meet or expand their private 
networks, allowing them greater access to people with certain needs 
or resources. This allows sharing at an unprecedented scale. It could 
indeed generate a Sharing Economy if sharing were to continue as 
the institutional norm and the platform was operated on a non-profit 
basis. At this point, however, the institutional norms often break-
down. Some Platform Operators have looked for ways to profit and 
the denomination “Sharing Economy” becomes less applicable and 
of questionable accuracy.25  
Platform Operators are, for the most part, not altruistically mo-
tivated actors interested in sharing. Rather, as argued below, they 
are profit-driven entities.26 Accordingly, they have discovered ways 
to monetize the otherwise altruistic sharing behavior.27 They have 
shifted the use of the technology from sharing to profit-making, thus 
commoditizing altruism. However, they have continued to be char-
acterized as contributing to the Sharing Economy despite not actu-
ally “sharing.”28  
Different kinds of practices and transactions are included under 
the concept of the “Sharing Economy,”29 causing confusion in de-
fining the phenomenon. Activities such as clothes swapping, home 
swapping, lending couches, dating platforms, online stores, a wide 
variety of services (such as car transportation, delivery, food prepa-
ration, dog walking, pet sitting, online streaming, personal parking 
 
25 See infra pp. 1037–42. 
26 See infra p. 1042. 
27 See infra p. 1042. 
28 See infra note 134. 
29 Juliet Schor explains that “[m]any organizations have been eager to position 
themselves under the ‘big tent’ of the sharing economy because of the positive symbolic 
meaning of sharing, the magnetism of innovative digital technologies, and the rapidly 
growing volume of sharing activity.” Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, 
GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), https://greattransition.org/publication/debatin
g-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/2TZS-JTWU]. 
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valet, and butler, legal, medical, financial, and educational services), 
and renting of goods (such as film equipment, watches, houses, toys, 
offices, parking spaces, household tools, and bikes), are examples 
of transactions and practices that are bundled together under the 
term “Sharing Economy.”30 This situation is problematic because it 
prevents appropriate delimitation of the phenomenon, which, in 
turn, hinders legal analysis and appropriate regulation.31 
As the Sharing Economy spread, scholarship about the new 
“sharing” model emerged and became a hot topic. The Sharing 
Economy has been a topic of research in different disciplines, such 
as economics,32 geography,33 tourism,34 sociology,35 business 
 
30 Janelle Orsi, for instance, includes in the scope of the “Sharing Economy” the 
following practices: cohousing communities, community gardens, social enterprises, 
community-owned enterprises, shared commercial kitchens, car-sharing groups, eco-
villages, local currencies, barter networks, time banks, gift economies, community land 
trusts, grocery cooperatives, worker cooperatives, community-supported agriculture, 
community-supported kitchens, credit unions, creative commons licensing, housing 
cooperatives, childcare cooperatives, renewable energy cooperatives, tool lending libraries, 
co-working spaces, and collaborative consumption. ORSI, supra note 1, at 2–3. See also 
Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 562 (providing examples of both “sharing” firms and 
practices considered part of the Sharing Economy). 
31 As Hobbes noted, “[t]he first cause of [a]bsurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of 
[m]ethod; in that they begin not their [r]atiocination from [d]efinitions; that is, from settled 
significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of 
the numerall words, one, two, and three.” THOMAS HOBBES & W. G. POGSON 
SMITH, HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN: REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1651 35 (1909). Wesley 
Hohfeld also explains that 
[e]ven if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of 
terminology, its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of definite 
recognition and persistent effort toward improvement; for in any 
closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued 
words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression. As a 
matter of fact, however, the above mentioned inadequacy and 
ambiguity of terms unfortunately reflect, all too often, corresponding 
paucity and confusion as regards actual legal conceptions. 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–29 (1913-1914). 
32 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1. 
33 See, e.g., Lizzie Richardson, Performing the Sharing Economy, 67 GEOFORUM 121 
(2015). 
34 See, e.g., Cindy Yoonjoung Heo, Sharing Economy and Prospects in Tourism 
Research, 58 ANNALS TOURISM RES. 166 (2016). 
35 See, e.g., Davide Arcidiacono et al., Sharing What? The ‘Sharing Economy’ in the 
Sociological Debate, 66 SOC. REV. 275 (2018). 
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management,36 architecture,37 and law.38 As noted, however, no 
consensus has emerged on what the Sharing Economy is.39 For ex-
ample, the Sharing Economy has been defined as (1) a temporary 
access between consumers to underutilized physical assets, possibly 
for money;40 (2) a group of systems that enable the sharing of un-
derused assets or services, for free or for a fee, between individuals 
or organizations;41 and (3) an umbrella concept encompassing sev-
eral information and communication technologies that endorse the 
consumption of goods and services through online platforms.42 
Other authors do not provide a specific definition of the Sharing 
Economy but single out specific elements they consider founda-
tional to the phenomenon. For example, Lisa Gansky, one of the first 
authors to develop the idea of the Sharing Economy, describes it as 
the “Mesh.”43 While Gansky does not provide a definition of the 
phenomenon, she does offer four characteristics of the “Mesh busi-
ness”: (1) something that can be shared, (2) the use of advanced web 
and mobile data networks, (3) a focus on physical goods, and (4) the 
engagement with costumers through social media.44 Similarly, Arun 
Sundararajan, who uses the term “Crowd-Based Capitalism,” does 
not provide a definition.45 He does, however, propose four 
 
36 See, e.g., Pablo Muñoz & Boyd Cohen, A Compass for Navigating Sharing Economy 
Business Models, 61 CAL. MGMT. REV. 114 (2018). 
37 See, e.g., Richard Coyne & Tolulope Onabolu, Blockchain for Architects: Challenges 
from the Sharing Economy, 21 ARQ: ARCHITECTURAL RES. Q. 369 (2017). 
38 See generally, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1. 
39 See Valentin Clemens et al., The Sharing Economy Landscape: Structuring Research 
from Airbnb to Zipcar, 2020 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 1, 4 (2020) (explaining, after a 
quantitative analysis of 590 articles on the Sharing Economy, that “[t]he wide dispersion 
of research fields has enticed researchers to engage in micro-analyses of one specific 
business model…within the sharing economy rather than pursuing the development of 
higher-level concepts and theories around it. This has led to isolated research streams that 
talk about similar phenomena with different languages.”). 
40 Koen Frenken & Juliet Schor, Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective, 23 
ENV’T INNOVATION & SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 3, 5 (2017). 
41 Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy: Dictionary of Commonly Used Terms, 
MEDIUM (Oct. 20, 2015), https://medium.com/@rachelbotsman/the-sharing-economy-
dictionary-of-commonly-used-terms-d1a696691d12 [https://perma.cc/BE2F-Q5UT]. 
42 Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative 
Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047, 2047 (2016). 
43 GANSKY, supra note 1, at 5.  
44 Id. at 16. 
45 SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 1.  
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characteristics of the phenomenon: (1) “largely market-based,” (2) 
“high-impact capital,” (3) “crowd-based ‘networks’” instead of  
centralized institutions, and (4) the blurring of lines—whether be-
tween personal and professional services, fully employed and casual 
labor, independent and dependent contractor, or work and leisure.46  
The same approach has been taken by Rachel Botsman and Roo 
Rogers who also find four underlying elements.47 They refer to the 
phenomenon as “Collaborative Consumption,” and identify it with: 
(1) critical mass, (2) idling capacity, (3) belief in the commons, and 
(4) trust among strangers.48 Thus, the scholarly ideas on the Sharing 
Economy are broad, segmented, and, to a great extent using unre-
lated terms in the hope of identifying a singular underlying concep-
tual foundation.49 
Legal scholarship on the Sharing Economy is no different. While 
not as profuse as the wider business and related literature on the 
topic, current legal scholarship also discusses the Sharing Economy 
without a commonly accepted definition. Manifold definitions can 
be found in the legal scholarship. For instance, Lawrence Lessig, 
perhaps the first legal scholar to address the term “Sharing Econ-
omy,”50 limits the phenomenon to non-monetary transactions as an 
alternative to the “Commercial Economy.”51 In Lessig’s definition, 
the term is limited to an economy where access is regulated by a set 
of social relations other than money.52 Conversely, Stephen R. Mil-
ler refers to the Sharing Economy as an economic model where peo-
ple create and share goods, services, space, and money.53 Daniel 
Rauch and David Schleicher define the Sharing Economy as a dy-
namic of reduction in transaction costs which permits disaggregated 
 
46 Id. at 27. 
47 BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 75.  
48 Id. 
49 See Clemens et al., supra note 39, at 5 (claiming that “[t]he research in the field of the 
sharing economy is much more phenomenological than theoretical….Thus, most of the 
existing studies do not use or provide comprehensive theoretical frameworks….” ). 
50 See supra note 10.  
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 145 (2008). 
52 Id. 
53     Miller, supra note 8, at 150.  
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consumption.54 Rauch and Schleicher include two broad categories 
under this term: (1) Asset Hubs, companies renting physical assets 
directly owned by such firms and (2) Peer-to-Peer Sharing Net-
works, networks that connect would-be sellers or workers with 
would-be buyers or employers.55 
By contrast, Vanessa Katz claims that “sharing” platforms are 
markets only for peer-to-peer services, rejecting Rauch and Schlei-
cher’s Asset Hub category.56 This difference explains why Katz, for 
example, defines the Sharing Economy as a business model where 
an online intermediary acts as a market for peer-to-peer services fa-
cilitating exchanges by lowering transaction costs,57 whereas others, 
such as Lessig, use the term for non-profit activities.58 Finally, also 
worth mentioning is Ryan Calo and Alex Rosenblat’s use. They up-
hold that the “sharing” model is an umbrella term which includes 
not only a group of techniques and practices that facilitate transac-
tions among strangers through digital platforms, but also a rhetorical 
strategy to attract support while avoiding restriction and regula-
tion.59 
Still, other legal scholars see no need to provide a definition of 
the term Sharing Economy but simply focus on elements, character-
istics, or qualities that they consider are indicative. For example, So-
fia Ranchordás claims that “[t]he Sharing Economy presupposes 
two elements: the existence of physical ‘shareable goods that sys-
tematically have excess capacity,’ and a sharing attitude or motiva-
tion.”60 Kellen Zale, in turn, proposes four different characteristics 
associated with the Sharing Economy: (1) monetization of assets, 
(2) focus on the access to these assets instead on their ownership, 
(3) reliance on technology to allow the access to the assets, and (4) 
exclusive involvement of individuals rather than businesses in the 
 
54 Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 912. 
55 Id. at 913–15. 
56 Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1070 
(2015). 
57  Id. at 1070. 
58 LESSIG, supra note 51, at 145.  
59 Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information and Power, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1625, 1670 (2017). 
60 Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing 
Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 416 (2015). 
2021] THE SHARING ECONOMY & THE “PUP MODEL” 1009 
 
Sharing Economy transactions.61 Finally, Janelle Orsi asserts that 
“[a]lthough it is hard to encapsulate the qualities of this new econ-
omy, it generally facilitates community ownership, localized pro-
duction, sharing, cooperation, small-scale enterprise, and the regen-
eration of economic and natural abundance.”62 Accordingly, the le-
gal scholarship, like the broader scholarly context, is unclear in its 
use of the term and in fact, the underlying concept. 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, there is no common  
understanding of the phenomenon. First, there is no unanimous ter-
minology of the phenomenon. It is referred to by a variety of terms, 
such as the “Sharing Economy,” “The Mesh,” “Crowd-Based Capi-
talism,” and “Collaborative Consumption.”63 Further, as the analy-
sis also shows, there is no consensus on the nature of the underlying 
phenomenon. While some authors do not define it, others refer to 
the phenomenon as an economy, a business model, or a set of tech-
niques and practices. Finally, the analysis shows that there are  
no commonly agreed upon characteristics of the phenomenon.  
On one end of the spectrum, some authors understand the Sharing 
Economy model is essentially for-profit, refers to peer-to-peer (P2P) 
activities, deals exclusively with physical assets, and is not con-
cerned about trust. On the other end, differing authors suggest that 
the model is not for profit, includes services and organizations in the 
transactions (P2B or B2P), and is associated with considerations 
about trust. This absence of agreement reflects underlying ambigu-
ity in the concept of the Sharing Economy itself. As legal scholar 
Kellen Zale argues: “[t]he debate over the sharing economy thus re-
mains frustrating and controversial in large part because we lack a 
doctrinally cohesive and normatively satisfying way of talking about 
the underlying activities occurring within the sharing economy.”64 
 
61 Zale, supra note 1, at 527. 
62 ORSI, supra note 1, at 2. 
63 See supra note 1 for more examples of denominations of the Sharing Economy. 
64 Zale, supra note 1, at 509–10; see also Bryan P. Schwartz & Ellie Einarson, The 
Disruptive Force of the Sharing Economy, 18 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 221, 223 
(2018) (arguing that the “[d]efinitional ambiguity demonstrates the paradox of the sharing 
economy, perceived as both an alternative to the capitalist system and an embodiment of 
it.”). 
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This Article argues that the Sharing Economy model can be best 
understood by applying contract and property law. It argues that the 
allocation of contractual and property rights and duties form the 
heart of the transactions executed in the Sharing Economy model. 
For example, the Sharing Economy facilitates an unusual exercise 
of property rights by allowing use of private property by the public. 
To be properly understood, the extent of that usage must be revisited 
from a property law and contract law perspectives—a matter we can 
only touch upon in this definitional Article. A combined analysis of 
property law and contract law is, then, critical to understanding and 
addressing the Sharing Economy. 
However, analysis of the Sharing Economy from both property 
and contract law perspectives has been largely overlooked. Most of 
the legal scholarship has based its analysis on non-legal concepts, 
effectively preventing a law-oriented discussion of its conceptual 
foundations.65 To fill this gap, next, this Article provides a legally 
tailored definition and analysis of the Sharing Economy. 
 
II. LEGAL THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
This part explains the concepts underlying the Sharing Economy 
by applying legal frameworks from property and contract law. The 
first theoretical foundation is drawn from Tony Honoré’s work. 
While Honoré’s focus was on the overall concept of “ownership,” 
his analysis provides a framework for analyzing the content and al-
location of property rights generally.66 Honoré argues that certain 
incidents of ownership must be generally present for a person to be 
considered the owner of a thing.67 These “standard incidents of 
 
65 For example, some legal scholars replicate non-legal definitions to discuss the 
phenomenon. See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 
43 PEPP. L. R. 61, 76 (2015) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption]; Shelly Kreiczer-
Levy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 174 (2017) [hereinafter 
Kreiczer-Levy, Share]; Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Property Without Personhood, 47 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 771, 785 (2017) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Property]. 
66 TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (1987). 
67 Id. at 165. Things or property, following Kevin Gray’s theoretical contribution, are 
understood as excludable resources for the purposes of this article. See infra p. 1012. 
Consequently, the terms thing(s), property and excludable resource(s) are used 
interchangeably throughout this article.  
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ownership” are defined as “those legal rights, duties, and other inci-
dents which apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the 
greatest interest in a thing admitted by a mature legal system.”68 
Honoré’s standard incidents of ownership, also called the “bundle 
of rights,”69 are:70 
The right to possess: the right to have exclusive control of the 
thing;71 
The right to use: the right to enjoy the thing;72 
The right to manage: the right to decide how and by whom the 
thing will be used;73 
The right to the income: the right to the benefits derived from 
the thing;74 
The right to the capital: the power to alienate the thing and the 
liberty to consume, waste or destroy it;75 
The right to security: the right to remain owner of the thing in-
definitely as long as the owner remains solvent;76 
 
68 HONORÉ, supra note 66, at 161. Honoré contrasts this greatest interest in the thing 
with easements, short leases, licenses, special property, and mere detention, which 
represent lesser interests. Id. at 175. 
69 Technically, Honoré’s standard incidents of ownership together with Wesley Hohfeld’s 
scheme of correlatives and opposites jural relations compound the “bundle of rights” 
perception of property. See J. E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996) (explaining that “[i]n its conventional formulation, the 
bundle of rights thesis is a combination of Wesley Hohfeld's analysis of rights 
and…Honoré's description of the incidents of ownership.”); DUNCAN SHEEHAN, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2011) (observing that “[t]his idea of the bundle 
of rights derives from a combination of Honoré and Hohfeld.”).  
70 HONORÉ, supra note 66, at 165.  
71 Id. at 166. 
72 Id. at 168. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 169. 
75 Id. at 170. See also Penner, supra note 69, at 759 (explaining that “[t]he motivation 
behind grouping these powers and liberties together seems to be that these involve the 
extinction of the relationship between the owner and the thing, either by its transfer or its 
destruction.”). 
76 See HONORÉ, supra note 66, at 171. 
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The incident77 of transmissibility: indefinite transmission of the 
owners’ interests to their lawful successors;78 
The incident of absence of term: lack of a term limiting the own-
ership interest;79 
The incident of residuarity: meaning that the owner has a resid-
ual right to retake the ownership rights previously transferred to the 
holders of lesser interests;80 
The duty to prevent harm: the duty to prevent the thing from 
being used by the owner or by others to harm others;81 
The liability to execution: the possibility to lose the ownership 
rights as a result of debts.82 
In analyzing the legal concept of ownership and the incidents of 
ownership, Honoré’s work provides a framework to identify the spe-
cific property rights that exist, as well as the substantive content of 
these rights. The framework, therefore, identifies the specific inci-
dents of ownership that could be transferred from the owner to a 
transferee.83 
The second useful analytical framework in property law is of-
fered by Kevin Gray.84 Gray focuses on the “propertisation” of re-
sources or, in other words, the determination of whether a resource 
can be held as property.85 Gray claims that a resource can only be 
“propertised” if it is excludable.86 A resource is excludable “only if 
 
77 Following Hart’s thought, Honoré refrains from calling this incident a right because, 
under his view, the exercise of a right must depend on the choice of the holder, which does 
not happen with this particular incident. See id. at 173. This claim can also be applied to 
the incidents of absence of term and residuarity. Id.  
78 Id. at 172. 
79 See id. at 172–73. 
80 Id. at 165, 177–79. 
81 Id. at 174. 
82 See id. at 175. 
83 For purposes of this Article, “transfer” is understood as “[a]ny mode of disposing of 
or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, including a gift, the payment of money, 
release, lease, or creation of a lien or other encumbrance”, and “transaction” is “[a]ny 
activity involving two or more persons.” Transaction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019).  
84 Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252 (1991). 
85 See id. at 256. 
86 Id. at 268. 
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it is feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control over 
the access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the re-
source.”87 This, according to Gray, can be completed if the resource 
is physically, legally, or morally excludable.88 A resource is physi-
cally non-excludable when it is not possible to exclude others from 
access to the benefits of the resource, like the beam of light coming 
from a lighthouse.89 A resource is legally non-excludable when it is 
not protected against others by legal means, such as an intellectual 
property regime.90 Lastly, resources are morally non-excludable 
when they are “perceived to be so central or intrinsic to constructive 
human coexistence that it would be severely anti-social that these 
resources should be removed from the commons.”91 Human free-
doms illustrate this category. Property is, thus, “a power-relation 
constituted by legally sanctioned control over access to the benefits 
of excludable resources.”92 Therefore, the thesis of “propertisation” 
of resources through excludability aids in determining whether a 
thing can be deemed property or not. In other words, whether it is a 
candidate for the Sharing Economy’s property regime. 
The last analytical framework necessary for our analysis of the 
Sharing Economy is the foundation of contract law. As legal scholar 
Samuel Williston observes, “[t]he requirements for the formation of 
a simple contract are: (1) [p]arties of legal capacity; (2) an expres-
sion of mutual assent of the parties to a promise, or set of promises, 
[and] (3) an agreed valid consideration.”93 Valid consideration in a 
 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 269. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 273. 
91 Id. at 280. 
92 Id. at 295. 
93 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 17 (1924). The author explains that 
“[c]ontracts which derive their efficacy from the substance of the transaction rather than 
its form are called simple contracts.” Id. at 10. See also Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 
266, 270 (Miss. 2003) (explaining that the essential elements for the formation of a valid 
contract are: two or more contracting parties with the legal capacity to make a contract, 
consideration, mutual assent, an agreement that is sufficiently definite, and no legal 
prohibition preventing contract formation); Hanson v. Water Ski Mania Estates, 108 P.3d 
481, 485 (Mont. 2005) (stating that “[i]t is well established that the essential elements of a 
contract, whether written or oral, are: 1) identifiable parties capable of contracting; 2) 
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bilateral contract, in turn, makes reference to “[m]utual promises in 
each of which the promisor undertakes some act or forbearance 
[consideration] that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the 
promisor or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of which is ren-
dered void by any rule of law other than that relating to considera-
tion. . . .”94 Consequently, following Williston, a binding contract 
arises from an agreement between persons with legal capacity who 
exchange mutual promises which are favorable to the promisee or 
unfavorable to the promisor.95 Next, this Article continues to dis-
sect the Sharing Economy by examining the two component terms,  
sharing and economy. 
 
III. LEGAL SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TERM “SHARING 
ECONOMY” 
To create a definition of “Sharing Economy,” the terms sharing 
and economy must be analyzed. This part is divided into three sub-
sections: the first subsection is aimed at the legal analysis of the term 
sharing; the second addresses analysis of the term economy; and the 
final considers their potential combination in law and draws some 
conclusions. 
A. Legal Analysis of the Term “Sharing” 
The Sharing Economy, as an umbrella concept, includes a range 
of different activities, transfers, and practices. For example, 
 
consent of these parties; 3) a lawful object; and 4) sufficient cause or consideration.”); 
Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (asserting 
that the essential elements of a contract include an offer and acceptance, contractual 
capacity, consideration, a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of 
consideration). 
94 WILLISTON, supra note 93, at 215. See also Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 631 
(1925) (“A consideration has been defined as a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or 
detriment to the party to whom the promise is made.”); Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 
153 Conn. 527, 531 (1966) (arguing that “[i]n defining the elements of the rule, we have 
stated that consideration consists of ‘a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment 
to the party to whom the promise is made.’ An exchange of promises is sufficient 
consideration to support a contract.” (citation omitted) (quoting Finlay, 103 Conn. at 631)); 
Perlmuter Printing Co., 436 F. Supp. at 414 (defining consideration as “the bargained for 
legal benefit and/or detriment”). 
95 WILLISTON, supra note 93, at 17. 
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transportation services provided by Uber’s drivers and paid by 
Uber’s Users, or lodgment provided by Airbnb’s Providers and paid 
for by Airbnb’s Users, are examples of these activities, transfers, 
and practices.96 
Black’s Law Dictionary provides two definitions of the verb to 
share: (1) “[t]o divide (something) into portions” or (2) “[t]o enjoy 
or partake of (a power, right, etc.).”97 Three different concepts of the 
verb to share can be deduced from these definitions. First, sharing 
can be understood as dividing something into portions. In this defi-
nition, the verbs to share and to divide are synonymous. The defini-
tion applies to cases such as sharing—or dividing—of profits under 
a partnership agreement. As the Sharing Economy is understood  
today, it cannot be appropriately described as dividing or partition-
ing a thing. 
The second definition refers to sharing as the enjoyment of a 
right, power, or other legal category.98 It conceptualizes the verb to 
share, perhaps oddly, as an individual behavior rather than a collec-
tive one, in that one can “enjoy” a right without the involvement of 
others. However, this individual behavior does not describe the 
transfers and transactions performed within the Sharing Economy, 
which necessarily involve multiple parties. Thus, sharing as enjoy-
ment is not a suitable definition to explain legally the term sharing 
within the overall term “Sharing Economy.” 
The third definition, sharing as partaking,99 provides a better de-
scription of the phenomenon and so is helpful for the analysis. Par-
take means to “become involved with or take part in something with 
other people.”100 In this definition of the term, the verb to share is 
understood as being involved with or taking part in a right, power, 
 
96  Note that these activities, transfers, and practices indicate the association of the Sharing 
Economy with the verb to share and not the noun share. Because of this, this analysis 
focuses on the verb to share instead of the noun share. The noun share, when used to mean 
a part of something—as in a share of an estate or shares of a corporation—is not part of 
this analysis. 
97 Share, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Partake, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
dictionary/english/partake [https://perma.cc/XG47-8RVG]. 
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or something else with another person. For example, when A lends 
B a laptop for one day, B becomes involved in the property rights A 
holds as the owner of the laptop. Applying this definition to our 
property analysis, we see that sharing is properly understood as the 
owner of a thing allowing others to be involved or taking part of the 
owner’s rights in that thing. 
Thus, from a legal perspective, sharing can be defined as the 
partial transfer of the standard incidents of ownership––the “bundle 
of rights.” Sharing is not about transferring the ownership of the 
thing—namely, all the standard incidents of ownership—but the 
partial transfer of one or more of the bundle of rights.101 As a result, 
sharing, from a property law perspective, is the transfer of some in-
cidents of ownership, such as the right to possess or the right to use, 
without transferring the ownership of the thing.102 It is an incom-
plete or partial transfer of property rights. 
The term sharing has another layer. As a verb, the term includes 
an action, a transfer element, a mechanism, or a process that allows 
parties previously not partaking to participate. This transfer aspect 
of the term, as this Article argues, is critical to the definition of the 
term “Sharing Economy.” This facet of the word, not found in 
Black’s Law Dictionary, draws attention to the absence of consider-
ation in sharing transfers. Sharing transactions do not contain 
 
101 See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, supra note 65, at 156, 188 (arguing that “share” is a type 
of access and access is a casual, short-term use of property); Donald J. Kochan, I Share, 
Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 913 (2017) (explaining that “[w]hen I share 
property, what is mine does not become yours; it actually remains mine.”). 
102 Even though the entitlement of one or more standard incidents of ownership is 
required to share, a person is not required to be the owner of the thing—namely, the holder 
of all the incidents of ownership—in order to share it. For example, if B is a tenant in A’s 
apartment, B is not entitled to the entire bundle of A’s rights but just to some of them—
e.g., the right to possess, the right to use and the right to manage. However, B, exercising 
his or her right to manage, can allow a relative (C) to stay in the property while B is overseas 
by transferring his or her rights to possess and use the apartment to C. Here, B would have 
shared to C the apartment owned by A. This perception is consistent with the legal maxims 
nemo dat quod non habet (“no one gives a better title to property than he himself 
possesses”) and nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse haberet (“[n]o one 
can transfer to another a greater right than he himself might have”). Share, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
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mutual promises but are unilateral promises of the owner103 to share 
their property. In other words, the owner of the thing makes a gra-
tuitous transfer of certain incidents of ownership i.e. without any 
quid pro quo.104 Consequently, no contract is created between the 
parties involved in sharing transfers because one of the essential el-
ements for the formation of contracts—consideration—is not pre-
sent in the transfer.105 A sharing transfer is a nudum pactum106 or 
“one-way” agreement that is not legally enforceable as a contract.107 
Therefore, in an event properly described as a sharing transfer, only 
the owner is making a promise: a gratuitous, partial transfer of his 
or her bundle of rights to another person who, without giving any-
thing in exchange, will enjoy such rights.  
The doctrine of consideration is crucial in the delineation of the 
term “Sharing Economy.” Without this doctrine, businesses which 
are radically different seem similar. They will be equally included 
under the umbrella concept of the Sharing Economy. The difference 
 
103 Although sharing transactions can also be started by non-owners—see supra note 
102—the example of the owner (holder of all incidents of ownership) as the actor who 
shares the property is maintained for purposes of clarity. 
104 For example, Daniel B. Kelly differentiates sharing and exchange transactions by 
explaining that, “[u]nlike sharing, which entails a gratuitous transfer, exchange entails a 
transfer with consideration.” This explains why the author mentions gratuitous licenses, 
gratuitous easements and gratuitous bailments as examples of sharing transactions. Daniel 
B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 873, 886, 896, 901 (2013). See also 
Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, & Subjective Well-
Being, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1380 n.93 (2018) (identifying gratuitous transfers as actual 
sharing); Diamond Smith, Renting Diversity: Airbnb as the Modern Form of Housing 
Dscrimination, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 581, 585 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he word ‘sharing’ has 
positive connotations, evoking thoughts of gratuitous acts towards fellow members of 
society.”). 
105 See supra p. 1013. See also Stein, supra note 1, at 796 (explaining that the word 
“share” connotes “bestowing something without consideration, as when a child shares their 
candy with a classmate, where it would be unusual to expect payment.”). 
106 See PHILIP CLARKE & JULIE CLARKE, CONTRACT LAW: COMMENTARIES, CASES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 114 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining that without consideration, the agreement “is 
a nudum pactum and unenforceable as a contract.”); Nudum Pactum, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a nudum pactum as an “agreement that is 
unenforceable as a contract because it is not ‘clothed’ with consideration.”). 
107 However, depending on the applicable jurisdiction, unilateral promises may be 
enforceable by other means as the inclusion of the promise in a deed (formal contract) or 
the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See CLARKE & CLARKE, supra note 
106, at 114–15. 
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between these businesses is simply the contractual doctrine of con-
sideration. For example, both Airbnb108 and CouchSurfing109 are 
platforms aimed to provide lodging to the public. While the former 
offers accommodation to people in exchange for money, the latter 
offers accommodation to people for free.110 This difference is im-
portant because the legal relationship between the parties on the 
Airbnb platform is markedly different from the legal relationship 
between the same parties if they were to use the CouchSurfing plat-
form. Airbnb arrangements include consideration and as a result, 
there is a binding contract between such parties with all the rights 
and duties that entails.111 However, by using the CouchSurfing  
platform the opposite is true: namely, there is no consideration  
and, therefore, there is no contract and no binding obligations on  
any of the parties.112 Thus, unlike contracts, sharing transactions do 
not contain mutual promises but are solely the unilateral promises 
of the owner. 
Hence, the verb to share—or sharing—can be defined from a 
legal perspective as the gratuitous transfer of one or more—but not 
all—property rights a person has in respect of a thing—an excluda-
ble resource.113 Sharing occurs when a non-owner partakes of the 
owner’s property rights in the owner’s resource. This occurs when 
the owner transfers one or more—but not all—of the bundle of rights 
 
108 See How Airbnb Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com.au/d/howairbnbworks 
[https://perma.cc/8F4P-7EYD]. 
109 See About Us, COUCHSURFING, https://about.couchsurfing.com/about/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YJH-S8A6]. 
110 Compare Payments, Pricing, and Refunds, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com.au/help/topic/1359/payments-pricing-and-refunds [https://perma.
cc/ZZ4A-9B9F] with Frequently Asked Questions, COUCHSURFING, https://about.couch 
surfing.com/about/faq/ [https://perma.cc/2YJH-S8A6]. 
111 See Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com.au/help/article/2908/terms-
of-service [https://perma.cc/W6UF-U7W3]. 
112 See COUCHSURFING, supra note 109. 
113 Kelly illustrates that “[s]haring enables donative transfers without requiring the 
transfer of ownership….” Kelly, supra note 104, at 877. Also, Donald J. Kochan explains 
that “[s]haring occurs when an owner-sharer grants a nonowner-sharee permission to use, 
possess, or access sharer’s property without transferring an ownership interest and without 
an ex ante legal obligation to so share.…‘Sharing,’ as the term is usually used in recent 
literature, is a special brand of permission; the retained ownership interest and the right of 
revocability distinguishes ‘sharing’ from these other types of relationships.” Kochan, supra 
note 101, at 945, 947. 
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to the non-owner for free––partial transfer.114 As Kochan, states: 
“[t]he sharee is merely partaking in a privileged use of the property 
as a result of the sharer’s choice.”115 This definition provides a 
strong demarcation of activities which can rightly be categorized as 
sharing and those which cannot. Only a partial, gratuitous transfer 
can be correctly categorized as sharing. All else is excluded. 
B. Legal Analysis of the Term “Economy” 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines economy as (1) “[t]he manage-
ment or administration of the wealth and resources of a community 
(such as a city, state, or country)”, (2) “[t]he sociopolitical organi-
zation of a community’s wealth and resources”, and (3) the 
“[r]estrained, thrifty, or sparing use of resources; efficiency.”116 
From a legal standpoint, therefore, the term economy is focused  
on the organization and use of the wealth and resources of a com-
munity.117 It encompasses any kind of transfer that facilitates a com-
munity’s management of its wealth, whether consideration-based 
transactions or sharing-based transfers. A community may consider 
sharing as an appropriate form of managing, organizing, or effi-
ciently using its wealth and resources. Accordingly, the use of the 
term “economy” as part of the overall term “Sharing Economy” 
could be considered appropriate if it is being used to denote gratui-
tous partial transfers allowing communities to efficiently manage 
their resources. 
This initial analysis, however, is incomplete as it does not en-
compass all activities commonly cast under the umbrella of the 
“Sharing Economy,” nor does it effectively delineate or describe 
 
114 Transactions that suppose a total transfer of the bundle of rights, thus, should not be 
considered sharing transactions from a property law perspective even if they take the legal 
form of granting co-ownership. See Kochan, supra note 101, at 939 (contrasting sharing—
as a time- or purpose-limited inclusion—with the transfer of ownership). According to the 
author, in “sharing” circumstances, “ownership remains with the sharer. If an individual 
simply sells her property to another or transfers part of her ownership interests, she may be 
giving someone an ‘ownership share’ in the property, but she is not engaging in 
‘sharing’.…The sharee is simply consuming resources in an access-related, rather than 
ownership-related, capacity.” Id. 
115 Id. at 944. 
116 Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
117 See id. 
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adequately apparently similar activities. To achieve this outcome, 
we must carefully consider varying types of transactions which in-
correctly apply the term “Sharing Economy.”  
This Article has argued that there are two characteristics which 
are necessary in order for an action to properly fall into the category  
sharing: (1) a partial transfer of property rights in a resource and (2) 
a gratuitous transfer. Yet, many parties include paid transfers and 
services when using the term “Sharing Economy.”118 Next, this Ar-
ticle will argue that these are incorrectly included in the concept of 
the Sharing Economy. 
Using this set of binaries—complete versus incomplete property 
transfers and gratuitous versus paid transactions—we can distin-
guish four different types of economies. Based on the property and 
contract law analysis above, we propose the Economies Matrix be-
low (See Figure 1). In this matrix, the left- and right-hand sides—
the contractual element—represent the existence or non-existence 
of consideration and, therefore, the creation or not of a contract. The 
upper and lower division of the matrix denotes the transfer of the 















118  See supra Part I. 
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Economies Matrix (Figure 1) 
As is evident from the diagram, this legal taxonomy of econo-
mies creates four categories. The top part of the matrix contains only 
those categories of transactions that comprise a complete transfer of 
the bundle of rights or provide a service. More particularly, these 
transactions must include Honoré’s right to the capital, right to se-
curity, incident of transmissibility, incident of absence of term, and 
incident of “residuarity,”119 or must provide a service. 
With respect to the lower half of the matrix, only those transac-
tions that do not purport to transfer the same set of rights and inci-
dents are included. It represents partial transfers of the bundle of 
rights. In other words, the Access Economy and Sharing Economy 
preclude the transfer of Honoré’s right to the capital, right to secu-
rity, incident of transmissibility, incident of absence of term, and 
incident of “residuarity.” 
Turning to the contractual division, the left-hand side of the ma-
trix contains those transactions that are consideration-based and, 
therefore, create a contract. Conversely, the right-hand side of the 
matrix incorporates transactions that do not create a contract be-
cause they lack consideration.  
 
119  See supra p. 1011. 
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Next, we discuss the matrix categories individually. Note that 
these categories can be widely applied to transactions across differ-
ent platforms. As our analysis is focused on the behavior facilitated 
by internet-based platforms, we use examples of activities which 
have been included—often incorrectly—under the umbrella term  
“Sharing Economy” and are platform based. 
The most common and widely understood category of transac-
tions is the Exchange Economy, which is represented on the upper 
left of the matrix. It is characterized by the exchange of goods and 
services, either for money or other consideration. As previously 
stated, “exchange entails a transfer with consideration.”120 Ex-
changes are not gratuitous transactions. Rather, these transactions 
are bound by contracts, transfers for value. In our classification ma-
trix, the category is limited to contract-based transfers which include 
the full bundle of rights. It also captures transactions for services. 
Thus, this category includes transactions currently, but incorrectly, 
associated with the “Sharing Economy.” Examples include transac-
tions made via TradeMade121 and Letgo,122 as well as Uber and other 
so-called ride-sharing services. 
The second category, termed the Gift Economy and on the upper 
right of the matrix, excludes those transactions which require con-
sideration and only includes those gratuitous transactions either for 
services or for the transfer of the entire bundle of property rights.123 
For example, donations on sites such as Ziilch, Leftoverswap, and 
 
120 See Kelly, supra note 104, at 873. 
121 TradeMade is an online platform that allows people to trade items. See Our 
Mission, Our Story, TRADEMADE, http://www.trademade-app.com/the-mission/ 
[https://perma.cc/M4B6-V2HJ]. 
122 Letgo is an online platform for buying and selling second-hand goods. See Who We 
Are, LETGO, https://we.letgo.com/ [https://perma.cc/4LGD-YQTP]. 
123 See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (explaining that “gifts” suppose 
the transfer of property and arise from detached and disinterested generosity, not from a 
moral or legal obligation or as a payment in return for services rendered); see also RICHARD 
HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 135–36, 148, 171, 197 (2009) (proposing 
four definitional elements of the gift: (1) gratuitousness, which in the Common Law legal 
system “involves a transaction without a valid legal consideration”; (2) a subjective 
element, which in the Common Law tradition refers to the donative intent; (3) an inter 
vivos transfer, which refer to “gratuitous transfers that take place during the donor’s 
lifetime”; and (4) the gift object, which in the Common Law system is not restricted to a 
particular type of property). 
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Freecycle fall into this category.124 Again, although some parties in-
clude these transactions within the umbrella concept of the “Sharing 
Economy,” we have demonstrated they are not. 
The third category, termed the Access Economy and placed on 
the lower left, includes only those transactions that require both con-
sideration and involve a partial transfer of property rights.125 Exam-
ples of this type of transactions, where access to property is paid for, 
include Airbnb, RentMyWardrobe, and Getaround. These transac-
tions will be misclassified if they are linked to the Sharing Econ-
omy—a common error. 
Finally, the fourth category on the lower right, Sharing Econ-
omy, is limited to those transfers bereft of consideration and which 
transfer only some but not all of the property rights.126 This latter 
category is the only true category properly denominated “Sharing 
Economy.” The most well-known example is CouchSurfing, but 
there are other examples such as TrustRoots and Bewelcome.127 
Every transfer and transaction commonly labelled “Sharing 
Economy”, therefore, can be included in the four categories of our 
matrix of economies differentiated by the doctrine of consideration 
and the legal concept of ownership (bundle of rights). The Exchange 
and Gift Economies include a grant of title––the bundle of rights in 
totum. By way of contrast, with the Access Economy and the Sharing 
Economy, the owner maintains the ultimate legal title of the re-
source, thus the transfer of property rights is only partial. Regarding 
 
124 In fact, this category is perhaps the foundation for the whole concept of the “Sharing 
Economy.” Early forays into the use of the internet for the sharing and dissemination of 
goods and services created great disruption and set precedents for how legal rights would 
develop and business models could be created. These early sites and services included free 
services such as Napster, Linux, and Wikipedia. 
125 See Zale, supra note 1, at 533 (defining access as temporary possession or use of 
property); see also Kochan, supra note 101, at 939 (contrasting access—as a time-or 
purpose-limited inclusion—with the transfer of ownership); see, e.g., Kreiczer-Levy, 
Share, supra note 65, at 160 (“In typical access transactions, owners allow short-term use 
of their car, bike, drill, or ladder to non-owners in exchange for monetary compensation.”). 
126 Lawrence Lessig, therefore, was right when, in 2008, he limited the ‘Sharing 
Economy’ to non-monetary transactions. See supra p. 1007. 
127 TrustRoots and BeWelcome are online platforms with the same purpose of 
CouchSurfing: to connect people who offer free accommodation with people who need it. 
See TRUSTROOTS, https://www.trustroots.org/ [https://perma.cc/96VB-48V3]; 
BEWELCOME, https://www.bewelcome.org/ [https://perma.cc/TU9T-C374]. 
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the contractual element, the Exchange Economy and the Access 
Economy both require consideration, relying on a contract. Con-
versely, the Gift Economy and the Sharing Economy both suppose 
the absence of consideration, hence the absence of contract.128 
Two final observations with respect to the Access Economy and 
Sharing Economy are necessary. First, in situations where the trans-
action is for the provision of services rather than the provision of 
goods, there can be no analysis of property rights. These transactions 
involve rights in personam rather than rights in rem.129 Therefore, 
transactions related to the provision of services will always be posi-
tioned within either the Exchange Economy (when consideration is 
present) or the Gift Economy (when consideration is missing). These 
are simply contracts for service. 
Second, when non-individualized fungible choses in posses-
sion—that is to say, interchangeable goods130—are the subject of the 
transaction,  that transaction can only be positioned within the  
Exchange or the Gift Economies. The transfer of these types of 
goods is premised upon their consumption and so entails the trans-
mission of the whole bundle of rights (ownership) because the trans-
feror does not expect to receive the same thing in return.  
Rather, the transferor expects the return of an equivalent in terms of 
quantity and quality to replace that which has been consumed.131  
 
128 See Penner, supra note 69, at 753 (explaining that sharing and giving are uses within 
the right to property that gratuitously benefit others); ORSI, supra note 1, at 97 (“[I]t’s 
important to acknowledge here that the things we provide for one another in the spirit of 
generosity, nurturing, or gift economy are ultimately enforced by social expectation, not 
by legal contract.”); see also LESSIG, supra note 51, at 119 (“Money in the sharing economy 
is not just inappropriate; it is poisonous.”). 
129    See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning 26 YALE L. J. 710, 718 (1916-1917). 
130 See SHEEHAN, supra note 69, at 28 (arguing that “fungibility is usually defined in 
terms of physical interchangeability—in other words it physically does not matter whether 
the claimant has one ton of barley, or oil rather than a different ton of the same substance 
from the given bulk.”); F. H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 25 (2d 
ed. 1982) (explaining that “goods which are normally fungible can be treated as 
individuals. Thus coins, if valued for their rareness or their aesthetic or archaeological 
interest, are not fungible, because they cannot be replaced by others.”). 
131 See LAWSON & RUDDEN, supra note 130, at 25 (arguing that fungible goods “can be 
replaced by equal quantities and qualities, and are estimated by weight, number, or 
measure.”). 
2021] THE SHARING ECONOMY & THE “PUP MODEL” 1025 
 
It creates and relies on rights in personam rather than rights in 
rem.132 Transactions dealing with non-individualized fungible 
choses in possession, thus, will always be positioned within either 
the Exchange Economy (when consideration is present) or the Gift 
Economy (when consideration is absent). 
C. Summary 
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that the common element 
in these activities—the new platform-based behaviors and practices 
rapidly spreading around the globe—is not sharing. Rather, the 
commonality among them all is the platform underlying the interac-
tions, transfers, and transactions among individuals, groups of peo-
ple, and businesses for a range of purposes.  
In our analysis we have identified the distinct features of four 
types of activities facilitated by Platform Operatorss in terms of con-
tract and property law, and we have created distinct categories for 
their analysis. For example, well-known Platform Operators can be 
readily located in the Exchange Economy (e.g., Uber), Gift Economy 
(e.g., Zilch), Access Economy (e.g., Airbnb), or Sharing Economy 
(e.g., CouchSurfing). The taxonomy, thus, helps understand that 
what has mistakenly been grouped together under the umbrella term 
“Sharing Economy” is better understood as a collection of platform-
based transactions.  
Further, these platform-based transactions do not form a singular 
type of economy. Rather, they can be categorized as falling into one 
of four well-understood economies. The taxonomy thus helps illus-
trate that the apparent commonality of these activities is more su-
perficial than actual. Rather, what causes them to be grouped to-
gether is the use of the platform technology that allows disaggre-
gated resources to be aggregated and distributed through market or 
 
132 “An example may help. If I borrow $20 from you and promise to repay it, I owe you 
$20. You do not expect to get the same $20 note back. Instead, I have a personal obligation 
to pay which corresponds to your personal right to be paid $20. This is a right in personam 
which can be enforced against me, regardless of what has become of the $20 note I 
borrowed . . . . In contrast, if I borrow your book and promise to return it, you continue to 
own the book. In addition to my promise, you have a right in rem which is enforceable 
against me because I have your book.” ROBERT CHAMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY LAW IN AUSTRALIA 7 (3d ed. 2013). 
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quasi-market type institutional arrangements, creating a new busi-
ness model. 
Three main conclusions are drawn from this Part. First, a range 
of different transactions are commonly and mistakenly lumped to-
gether in the term “Sharing Economy.” These transactions neither 
exclusively nor necessarily involve sharing.133 Second, the issue is 
not one of economies per se. Rather, it is about the use of platform 
technology and the creation of a new legal structure. The common 
denominator of these transactions is the PUP model, not the econ-
omy where it takes place. Finally, the term “Sharing Economy” is 
therefore incorrect and misleading to denominate all new platform-




133 See Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 570 (concluding the following as regards the 
“sharing” companies Zipcar, Etsy, and WeWork: “Put simply, there is no ‘sharing’ in the 
millions of transactions that take place on these and many other so-called ‘sharing’ 
platforms.”); John Infranca, Intermediary Institutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL. 
L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30 (2016) (contending that “[i]t has become a well-worn truism that 
little, if any, actual sharing occurs in the ‘sharing economy.’”). 
134 See Stemler, supra note 24, at 207 (arguing that “[d]espite the common perception, 
the term ‘Sharing Economy’ is clearly a misnomer . . . dominant companies within the 
Sharing Economy (Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, etc.) rarely enable sharing as it is commonly 
understood.”); Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 556 (contending that “[a]nother risk to 
consumers concerns the mistaken assumption that sharing economy companies always 
benefit society. Because members of the original sharing economy often touted a social 
and environmental mission, new sharing economy companies may benefit unjustly from a 
misperception that they are socially beneficial. Just as firms once engaged in 
‘greenwashing,’ some have suggested that organizations now engage in ‘sharewashing’–
claiming illusory benefits related to the sharing concept.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 525 
(explaining that “[l]abels are powerful agenda setters, and the intuitively positive 
connotations of the word ‘sharing’ may not make it the most objective moniker.”); see 
Schwartz & Einarson, supra note 64, at 223 (observing that “[o]ther academics are wary 
of the use of the word ‘sharing,’ since activities in the sharing economy are an economic 
exchange not unlike commercial relationships. Given that the sharing economy is anchored 
firmly in free market principles, financial gain and transactions motivated by self-interest, 
‘sharing’ may be a misnomer.”); see also Stein, supra note 1, at 801 (“The term ‘sharing’ 
is deceptive in one sense, for the so-called sharing economy is an anti-sharing economy in 
some ways . . . .”). 
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IV. PUP MODEL: PLATFORM OPERATOR-USER-PROVIDER 
As noted, this Article argues that the critical change in  economy 
arises from technological innovation—the development of the PUP 
model. We noted that the PUP model creates a much wider network 
of interactivity providing an opportunity for people to meet their 
needs and put inactive assets or time into economic productivity.  
It achieves this by aggregating and marketing the previously dis-
aggregated resources to a greater audience. This new technology 
creates opportunities in all four distinct parts of the economy: in the 
for-profit Exchange and Access Economies, and in the non-profit  
Sharing and Gift Economies. 
Crucially, from a legal standpoint, the PUP model inserts an in-
termediary, a third party into what were previously private, person-
ally based one-on-one transactions and interactions, some of which 
were gratuitous while others were for profit. From an economic 
point of view, in some instances, the technological innovation has 
fundamentally altered the nature of transfers or services and has 
changed the viability of the activity from a one-off or mode of addi-
tional income to a main source of income, particularly in the plat-
forms through which Providers supply services, such as Uber, Lyft, 
and TaskRabbit.  
What is particularly significant for purposes of our analysis are 
the implications of the for-profit Platform Operators, notably, those 
that do not belong to the true Sharing Economy. These Platform Op-
erators, such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit, while seeking the 
rhetorical shelter of the term “Sharing Economy,” are in fact distinct 
forms of businesses, creating new types of legal relations, or at least 
creating doubt about the applicability of existing legal categories. In 
the next Part, we analyze this for-profit model in greater detail using 
the prior contract and property analysis as set out in the matrix of 
economies above. 
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A. Defining Elements of the PUP Model 
From a legal perspective, the PUP model has two defining prop-
erties or elements. First, it has a triangular legal structure135 which 
involves three actors (See Figure 2): (1) a Platform Operator which 
using technology provides aggregation and interactivity to create a 
legal environment by setting the terms and conditions for all the ac-
tors; (2) a User who consumes the good or service on the terms and 
conditions set by the Platform Operator; and (3) a Provider who pro-
vides a good or service also abiding by the Platform Operator’s 
terms and conditions.136 
Figure 2 
 
It is important to note that each of the bi-directional arrows rep-
resents legal relationships. They indicate rights of contract or trans-
fer of property rights among the parties. Additionally, the three ac-
tors are not qualified, namely, they can be any type of person, such 
 
135 Understanding “structure” as “[a]ny construction, production, or piece of work 
artificially built up or composed of parts purposefully joined together. . . .” Structure, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
136 Platform Operators, thus, are not providers of the goods and services under the PUP 
model. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 100 (arguing that “[platform] companies are not selling 
the thing itself: the service, the product, the content. Rather, they are selling access to the 
software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between 
their users.”). This explains why bilateral structures—such as Netflix, where streaming 
services are provided directly to consumers; CapitalBikeShare, where the company is the 
owner of the bikes offered to the public; and Affirm, where direct loans are directly 
disbursed by the firm—are not part of the PUP model. Id.  
Platform
User Provider
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as a business entity (artificial or legal person) or an individual (hu-
man or natural person). 
The second element of the PUP model concerns the active role 
of Platform Operators. Platform Operators are at the core of the 
structure because they operate the technological platform137 for 
transactions to occur by both aggregating information and, in many 
instances, supplying ancillary services, such as facilitating payments 
required to engage in the provision and consumption of goods and 
services. Platform Operators administer the technology which cre-
ates the environment in which the actors operate and upon which the 
whole model is founded.138 This critical role allows Platform Oper-
ators to dictate the terms and conditions of the legal arrangements 
 
137 See Hamari et al., supra note 42, at 2050 (explaining that this phenomenon “operates 
through technological platforms, such as a website or mobile app. . . .”). This technological 
platform provided by the Platform Operator is enhanced by and dependent on “the modern 
power afforded by cloud computing, algorithmic matching, pervasive wireless Internet 
access, scaled user-networks, and near-universal customer ownership of smartphones and 
tablets.” See Lobel, supra note 1, at 94. According to Teresa Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, 
“[e]lectronic platforms are self-regulated communities managed by a platform operator. 
Despite that some functions can be designed and implemented to operate on a decentralized 
basis . . . electronic platforms are essentially centralized structures.” Teresa Rodríguez-de-
las-Heras, Rules for Electronic Platforms: The Role of Platforms and Intermediaries in 
Digital Economy, a Case for Harmonization, in MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 146, 149 
(United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 2017). 
138 As part of the 2017 Congress of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, Rodríguez-de-las-Heras explained: 
Electronic platforms, in all their variants (e-marketplaces, sharing-based 
platforms, business communities, social networks, crowdfunding platforms) 
are and operate as closed electronic environments. . . . The difference between 
an open environment and a closed one is essentially based on a legal 
factor…the closing of an environment is achieved by the use of a contractual 
infrastructure that create a contract-based trustworthy context for the users, 
self-contained, self-regulated, and, to the maximum possible extent, 
independent from domestic jurisdictions. Hence, an electronic platform, as a 
closed environment, is built by a set of agreements between the operator and 
the users’ community. In absence of specific legal rules, obligations and rights 
of platform operators are laid down by the contract terms between the operator 
and every user, and, consequently, the role to be actually performed by 
operators is devised by the set of contracts supporting the platform. 
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 148–49. 
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and control the rights, powers, and duties of Providers and Users.139 
As a result, Platform Operators unilaterally create an internal legal 
environment in which parties engage.140 In sum, the second element 
of the PUP model is the active role Platform Operators play: (1) in 
creating and operating the technological and legal environments, (2) 
creating and facilitating binding agreements with terms and condi-
tions that are strongly skewed in their favor, and (3) providing an-
cillary services. 
B. Types of PUP Models: The P-PUP Model 
As noted above, the PUP model can be either for-profit—profit-
driven PUP which we denominate “P-PUP”—or non-profit—which 
we denominate “N-PUP.”141 The operation of the P-PUP model de-
pends on the profits of both the Platform Operator and the Provider. 
Conversely, the operation of the N-PUP model is not underpinned 
by profit. 
The P-PUP model presupposes that the transactions between 
Providers and Users are contract-based. That is, transactions that 
 
139 See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an 
Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 254 (2015) (explaining that individuals 
rely on the Platform Operator “to advertise their products, connect them to potential 
customers, establish a contractual relationship, and facilitate payment.”); see also Stemler, 
supra note 2, at 39 (pointing out the importance of technology in regulating behavior 
through lex informatica. “Lex informatica is the concept involving the use of technological 
architectures to require or prohibit certain user interactions.”); see also Calo & Rosenblat, 
supra note 59, at 1652 (explaining that Platform Operators “design each participant’s entire 
digital experience from scratch. They build and update the apps or website portals that 
service providers and service users access. They structure the business model and 
acceptable forms of transaction. And they write the terms of service and privacy policies 
that every participant clicks through in order to use each service.”). 
140 Some authors have criticized the power Platform Operators have under this structure. 
See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 59, at 1650, 1653, 1661 (arguing Platform 
Operators create digital market manipulation, take advantage of their access to Providers 
and Users to influence stakeholders such as potential regulators, and hide information about 
the marketplace); Dyal-Chand, supra note 139, at 248, 292–93 (contending that big 
Platform Operators such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit (1) “have a great deal of power 
vis-à-vis the service providers . . . . These power imbalances inhibit worker participation 
and contribute to rent-seeking by the platform providers”, and (2) “have been able to 
develop a new model for doing business that takes advantage of collaboration without 
accepting all the associated costs. One such cost is that these companies have to share more 
power and responsibility with the businesses involved in their networks.”). 
141  See supra p. 1027. 
2021] THE SHARING ECONOMY & THE “PUP MODEL” 1031 
 
form part of the P-PUP model are supported by consideration. The 
existence of the consideration requirement is, then, a conditio sine 
qua non142 of the P-PUP model. 
Therefore, based on our Economies Matrix, the P-PUP model 
can only be located within the Exchange or Access Economies. The 
lack of consideration characterizing the transactions within the Gift 
and Sharing Economies excludes the P-PUP model in these econo-
mies. N-PUP models, thus, can only be located within the Gift and 
Sharing Economies (See Figure 3). 
Figure 3 
However, the P-PUP model needs to be distinguished further. 
This is because there are significantly different business models in-
volved. This differentiation helps particularize subclasses of P-PUP 
 
142 See Conditio sine qua non, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
conditio sine qua non or sine qua non as “[a]n indispensable condition or thing; something 
on which something else necessarily depends.”).  
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models that, ultimately, provide the defining characteristics of legal 
structures such as the ones utilized by Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRab-
bit—erroneously touted as “Sharing Economy” businesses. We are 
particularly interested in these types of businesses because they have 
caused some of the greatest disruptions in the legal environment. By 
identifying the specific legal characteristics of this subclass of P-
PUP model, this Article aims to provide a more accurate legal and 
conceptual analysis facilitating appropriate regulation for these 
businesses, that to date has tended to be elusive and ambiguous in 
terms of its legal nature. 
C. The TMP-PUP Model 
The P-PUP model can be further subclassified based on time-
limited partial transfers, time-limited service provisions, and the ac-
cepted forms of consideration. For purposes of this Article, the P-
PUP models that are time-limited and that only accept monetary 
consideration are denominated “TMP-PUPs” (Time-limited, Mone-
tary-consideration-based, Profit-driven PUP models). They are fo-
cused solely on time limited transactions—i.e., partial transfers of 
property rights, or time limited provision of services—and only ac-
cept consideration in monetary form. It is these businesses that have 
caused some of the greatest disruptions and are accordingly of great-
est concern. The TMP-PUP model is the legal structure adopted  
by Platform Operators such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit.  
It does not operate in the Sharing Economy nor in the Gift Economy.  
It exists only within the Exchange and Access Economies.  
Therefore, the defining properties of the TMP-PUP model are 
the following: 
First, the TMP-PUP model, like the PUP model, is a triangular 
legal structure composed of a Platform Operator, a Provider, and a 
User as its foundation.143 We further refine the TMP-PUP model, 
 
143 See Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 
111 (2018) (arguing that “[w]ork in the gig economy is also characterized by a triangular 
relationship. A company or platform links consumers seeking a product or service to a 
worker who can provide it.”); Marina Lao, Workers in the Gig Economy: The Case for 
Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018) 
(arguing that in the Sharing Economy, workers “provide services in a triangular 
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noting that (1) Platform Operators are not providers of the goods and 
services that Users seek and consume;144 (2) the triangular legal 
structure is comprised of three different legal relationships that may 
indicate rights of contract or transfer of property rights among the 
three parties;145 and (3) the three legal actors—Platform Operators, 
Providers, and Users—can be composed of any type of person, nat-
ural or artificial.146 
 
relationship where an online platform serves as an intermediary linking the workers to 
potential customers.”); Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 917 (explaining that “sharing 
platforms create and serve ‘two-sided’ markets: their users include both market-buyers and 
market-sellers. Examples include Uber, which serves drivers and riders; Airbnb, which 
serves homeowners and renters; and DogVacay, which serves pet-owners and pet-
sitters.”). 
144 See supra note 136. See also Gannon v. Airbnb Inc., 295 So. 3d 779, 783–84 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that Airbnb and other similar companies are simply conduits 
of the rental transaction and do not have any possessory interests in the properties rented 
through the platform); Katz, supra note 56, at 1071 (explaining that “unlike websites that 
act as online storefronts, sharing platforms are not direct service providers.”); Dyal-Chand, 
supra note 139, at 265 (identifying Providers as tiny businesses that act as suppliers). 
145 See supra p. 1028. See also Ill. Transport. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 
594, 598 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that one of the major differences between the model 
adopted by Uber and the model adopted by taxi companies is that Users ‘must sign up with 
Uber before being able to summon it, and the sign up creates a contractual relationship 
specifying such terms as fares, driver qualifications, insurance, and any special need of the 
potential customer owing to his or her having a disability.’); Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of 
Newark, 235 F. Supp. 3d 638, 646 (D.N.J. 2017) (explaining that in the TMP-PUP model, 
unlike the taxicab model, Platform Operators have a pre-existing contractual relationship 
with Users). 
146 Allowing legal entities to enter into the TMP-PUP model as Providers or Users is, 
ultimately, a business decision. For example, nowadays Uber has two different lines of 
business targeted to legal entities qua Users: Uber for Business and Uber Freight. See 
UBER, https://www.uber.com/au/en/ [https://perma.cc/WQC5-EGXG]. Similarly, 
Parkhound allows the rental of parking spaces not only by residents but also by businesses. 
Under this TMP-PUP, thus, Providers can be both natural persons and legal entities. See 
How It Works, PARKHOUND, https://www.parkhound.com.au/how-it-works  
[https://perma.cc/G44M-C7PV]. See also Terms, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com.au/ 
terms [https://perma.cc/YFS4-J8HM] (establishing the following in section 17 of the 
Terms of Service: “You must register an account to access and use many features of the 
Airbnb Platform. Registration is only permitted for legal entities, partnerships and natural 
persons who are 18 years or older.”). Regarding Platform Operators, positive law and legal 
scholarship have recognized the possibility that these actors can be constituted by a natural 
person. See, e.g., Road Transport (Public Passenger Services) Act 2001 (ACT) s 28 
(Austl.) (providing that any ‘person’, including corporations and individuals, can act as a 
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Second, in the TMP-PUP model, the Platform Operator has an 
active role. Like the general PUP model,147 in the TMP-PUP model 
Platform Operators facilitate the connection between Providers and 
Users through a platform,148 aggregate information, and usually sup-
ply ancillary services such as payment collection, processing ser-
vices, and customer support.149 Additionally, Platform Operators 
 
Platform Operator, called Transportation Booking Services in this Act). Further, according 
to Rodríguez-de-las-Heras: 
Rarely, the operator is an individual (sole trader) or natural person. More 
usually, the operator adopts any of the organizational forms, available in the 
jurisdiction where it is located, to run a business (corporations, incorporate 
joint-ventures, private companies, but also associations, cooperatives, or 
partnerships). Interestingly, those organizational forms entailing a distinct and 
separate legal personality are preferred. Likewise, commercial companies and 
corporations are the most widespread option.’ 
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 149. 
147 See supra p. 1029. 
148 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 139, at 248 (explaining that “[i]n the sharing economy, 
the key institutions that accomplish sharing are technological platforms that allow networks 
of individuals to connect with stable supplies of customers.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 537 
(contending that technology “has made it possible for two people – typically strangers – to 
engage in sharing activities that had previously taken place primarily in close-knit 
communities.”); Katz, supra note 56, at 1070 (explaining that “most sharing platforms 
operate through either a web portal or a mobile application (‘app’).”). 
149 Platform Operators can be involved in other types of ancillary services such as user 
information verification, local tax collection and remittance, dispute resolution, pricing 
services, and purchasing of insurance coverage. E.g., Kaseris v Rasier Pacific VOF [2017] 
FWC 6610 para 51–50(d) (Austl.) (explaining that Mr. Kaseris, the applicant and Uber 
driver, was charged a service fee by Uber for services including lead-generation services, 
payment collection and processing services and support services); Robert L. Redfearn, 
Sharing Economy Misclassification Employees and Independent Contractors in 
Transportation Network Companies 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2013, 1027 (2016) 
(explaining that Uber controls a great part of the ride transaction by (1) vetting the persons 
that apply to be Uber drivers, (2) setting fare rates based on its own formulas, (3) taking a 
cut of the total fare paid to the driver, and (4) monitoring drivers data). In this regard, 
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras explains: 
In managing the platform, the operator provides added-value services, adopts 
rules, monitors compliance, and penalizes infringements of internal rules by 
users. In sum, the operator acts as a service provider, a (contractual) regulator, 
and a (contractual) supervisor. Whereas the provision of services (payment 
management, insurance, inspection, rating, marketing) has a visible 
commercial impact, increasing the appeal of the offer in the market, fostering 
loyalty of users, and providing additional financial support; the tasks of 
regulating and supervising are key for the creation and preservation of trust. 
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unilaterally dictate the internal legal environment of the model.150 
They create a legal system which stipulates the rights and duties for 
the contractual parties up to and including procedures for dispute 
resolution and their ultimate determination.151 Consequently, Plat-
form Operators create the internal legal environment in which the 
three legal relationships comprising the triangular legal structure are 
created, developed, and terminated. 
Third, and specifically like the P-PUP model, the TMP-PUP 
model is a profit-driven model.152 The TMP-PUP model is de- 
signed for the profit of both the Platform Operator and the Pro-
vider.153 Fourth, again as in the P-PUP model, in the TMP-PUP the  
goods and services are provided exclusively on a contract-basis.154  
 
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 149. See also Dyal-Chand, supra note 139, at 
258 (arguing that, “[o]n the supply side, one thing that makes these markets revolutionary 
is the outsourced sharing of key business functions by the individuals and tiny businesses 
involved in networks for peer-to-peer rentals, financing, and sales. . . .”). 
150 See supra notes 138, 139 and accompanying text. See also Loewenstein, supra note 
1, at 1010 (mentioning that “Uber, for instance, uses a sophisticated mobile app to connect 
drivers to fare-paying customers (or riders). The company leverages this technology by 
structuring its legal relationship with the drivers. . . .”); Katz, supra note 56, at 1071 
(identifying the degree of control of the Platform Operator as a critical distinction between 
this actor and other online services. According to Katz, “[s]haring platforms exercise 
control over transactions by directing the form and content of listings, issuing minimum 
quality standards for providers, providing an electronic payment system, and charging a 
transaction fee for each exchange.”). 
151  Id. 
152 See Stemler, supra note 24, 222 (arguing that “the Sharing Economy is motivated by 
profit, not altruism.”); see also Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New 
Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV. 171, 178 (2016) (arguing that “the new sharing 
economy is largely driven by the for-profit motives of behemoth companies.”). 
153 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 1133, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting 
that “Uber derives profits from providing transportation services. . . .”); Calo & Rosenblat, 
supra note 59, at 1652 (arguing that this phenomenon has a simple business model: “It 
connects consumers to providers for a fee.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 528, 565 n. 240 
(explaining that individuals providing services through this phenomenon offer their labor 
and time in exchange for a fee, and identifying that “Airbnb, Uber, and Munchery, like 
many other sharing economy companies, are for-profit companies, not charitable 
institutions or community social clubs.”); Stemler, supra note 24, at 207 (explaining that 
in this phenomenon “cash, as opposed to altruism, motivates supply-side user behavior.”). 
154 See Caroline Meller-Hannich, Share Economy and Consumer Protection, in DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE 119, 125 (Reiner Schulze & 
Dirk Staudenmayer eds., 2016); Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 153 (observing 
 
1036 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:997 
 
All transactions that are part of this model are supported by consid-
eration.155 These two latter characteristics, for profit and contract 
basis, confirm that the TMP-PUP model operates exclusively in the 
Access or the Exchange Economies and not in the Gift and the Shar-
ing Economies. 
However, what makes the TMP-PUP model unique is two addi-
tional elements. These elements are related to the temporality of the 
transaction and to the consideration required of Users. In terms of 
the first element, both goods and services are the assets that can be 
transacted through the TMP-PUP model.156 These transactions, 
however, are time-limited. Providers agree to provide services to 
Users on an ad hoc or casual basis rather than a long-term basis.157 
For example, Uber drivers (Providers) supply the transportation ser-
vice to the Uber passengers (Users) in a casual basis. Alternatively, 
when the platform is used for the provision of goods under the TMP-
 
that “electronic platforms are contract-based buildings. Such a contractual infrastructure 
designs the liability regime and indeed allocates duties and liabilities between operators 
and platform’s members. . . .”). 
155 See Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the Sharing Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1407 
(2016) (arguing that, in this phenomenon, “[c]onsumers pay for the services and goods, 
and providers enjoy an additional, or main, source of income. All types of transactions are 
monetized. In contractual terms, we can say that all these exchanges are supported by 
consideration. . . .”); Lobel, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that “the platform tilts the balance 
away from altruistic/communal interactions to marketable/commodified exchanges.”); 
Infranca, supra note 133, at 30 (arguing that “[g]ratuitous sharing, or even bartering for 
that matter, does not mark the exchange of goods and services between buyers and sellers 
matched through . . .  platforms.”). 
156 See Zale, supra note 1, at 528 (arguing that the economic driver of the “Sharing 
Economy” is the monetization of two types of assets: goods or services); McPeak, supra 
note 152, at 178 (describing the “Sharing Economy” as a “group of new, innovative 
businesses that offer peer-to-peer goods and services through new technology.”); Rauch & 
Schleicher, supra note 1, at 915 (explaining that the peer-to-peer sharing network “can 
include either assets or services or both.”); John O. McGinnis, The Sharing Economy as an 
Equalizing Economy, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 334 (2018) (observing that “[t]he 
essence of the sharing economy is that it uses online agency to create markets in property 
and jobs that were not nearly as effective previously.”). 
157 See Zale, supra note 1, at 528 (explaining that one of the assets that are monetized 
through this model are services, which “are provided on an ad hoc basis by individuals 
offering their labor and time in exchange for a fee.”); Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 
915 (observing that, within this model, one-off Users hire Providers looking for quick 
gigs); Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 587–88 (explaining that the services provided 
through this phenomenon are on-demand and short-term services). 
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PUP model, the transfer is a partial transfer of property rights.158 For 
example, Airbnb hosts (Providers) transfer the right to possess or the 
right to use the property to the Airbnb guests (Users) instead of the 
entire bundle of rights (ownership). Note that while the long-term 
provision of services or total transfer of the bundle of property rights 
are within the technological and business capabilities of the P-PUP 
model, they are not part of the TMP-PUP model because they create 
a different legal liability and offer a different business model.  
Regarding the second element unique to the TMP-PUP model, 
the element of consideration, Users are required to pay money rather 
than barter or provide any other form of consideration for the goods 
or services supplied by Providers.159 Thus, the permanent or long-
term provision of services as well as the selling, bartering, exchang-
ing, and gifting of goods are excluded from the TMP-PUP model.160 
 
158 See Kochan, supra note 101, at 945 (explaining that one of the critical features of the 
phenomenon is the “exchange of interests in property and a conferral of rights to use or 
benefit from real or personal property.”); Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption, supra note 65, at 
92 (arguing that this phenomenon refers to “consumers who choose not to purchase 
property, but rather to bargain for short-term use.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 562 (arguing 
that “exclusivity of use or possession is necessarily embedded into property-sharing 
activities.”). “Sharing Economy” literature usually refers to this factor as the existence of 
access instead of ownership. See, e.g., GANSKY, supra note 1, at 5 (asserting that this 
phenomenon “is based on network-enabled sharing—on access rather than ownership.”); 
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at xv (asserting that this phenomenon “is enabling 
people to realize the enormous benefits of access to products and services over ownership. 
. . .”); Lobel, supra note 1, at 110 (including “access over ownership” as one of the ten 
fundamental principles of the model); Kochan, supra note 101, at 939 (contrasting access 
and ownership in order to understand the phenomenon); Zale, supra note 1, at 533 
(emphasizing that one of the characteristics of the model is the access to, rather than the 
ownership of, property). 
159 See Zale, supra note 1, at 561 (recognizing that “the monetization of assets is one of 
the defining features of the sharing economy. . . .”); Oei & Ring, supra note 1, at 990 
(contending that in this phenomenon, Platform Operators “enable consumers to summon 
rides, rent accommodations, or hire services from peers via personal computer or a mobile 
app, in exchange for payment.”); Lobel, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that this phenomenon 
“is growing exponentially, but it is not free. . . . The platform takes the saying that 
everything, and everyone, has a price quite literally.”). 
160 This characteristic entails that platforms mediating the transfer of the bundled 
ownership are not part of the TMP-PUP model, such as: (1) Amazon, eBay, and Craigslist 
(where goods are sold, part of the Exchange Economy); (2) BarterDaddy, Swapub, and 
TradeMade (where barters take place, part of the Exchange Economy);(3) Simbi, Listia, 
and Bunz (where goods are transferred for a digital unit of currency, part of the Exchange 
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In sum, the TMP-PUP model is a for-profit, triangular legal 
structure where two parties (Providers and Users) enter into binding 
contracts for the provision of goods (partial transfer of the property-
bundle of rights) or services (ad hoc or casual services) in exchange 
for monetary payment through an online platform operated by a 
third party (Platform Operator) with an active role in the definition 
and development of the legal conditions upon which the goods and 
services are provided.  
It is important to note, and perhaps of ultimate importance, that 
the PUP model and all its derivative sub-categories often operate in 
regulated environments, from the provision of accommodation  
services to public transport services. One of the major impacts of  
the PUP model, and particularly TMP-PUP’s models, has been the 
ability of Platform Operators to avoid public regulation of the activ-
ities applicable to other traditional providers. The PUP model has 
allowed activities to be shifted between regulatory regimes or cate-
gories. For example, the PUP model allows Platform Operators  
to be categorized as mere technology companies rather than employ-
ers, and Providers to be categorized as private contractors rather 
than employees. It allows risk shifting from enterprises to individual 
Providers. 
Any legal analysis of the PUP model not only needs to take  
account of the internal legal environment created by the Platform 
Operator, but also the external regulatory environment enabling not 
only the Platform Operator but the activities which it facilitates, in-
cluding the underlying contractual relations among itself, the Pro-
vider, and the User. We argue that it is this dual legal environment 
in which the Platform Operator dictates the terms and conditions for 
the participants and may shift the location of activities in terms of 
the external legal environment’s categories which constitutes a new 
legal structure—the legal PUP model. Thus, it is necessary when 
conceptualizing the PUP model to take account not only of PUP as 
a technology or PUP as a business model, but PUP as creating an 
entirely new legal structure. 
 
Economy); and (4) Ziilch, LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (where donations take place, part 
of the Gift Economy).  
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The distinctions developed in this Article are critical because 
prior scholarship has conflated the categories of economies while 
also conflating the Sharing Economy with the PUP model generally 
and the TMP-PUP model specifically. Furthermore, the judiciary 
has struggled to categorize the various phenomena under consider-
ation with the result that apparently incoherent decision-making  
and unpredictability have crept into the legal environment. The lack 
of appropriate categories and definitions has destabilized the law  
surrounding the PUP model businesses. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the different economies, including the Sharing 
Economy, and the theoretical development of the PUP model—and 
its subclasses the P-PUP and the TMP-PUP models—resolves a 
wide range of issues that have arisen because of new internet-based 
platforms. The development of the PUP model and its subclasses 
addresses a major gap in our understanding of this technological de-
velopment and its interaction with the legal system. We have argued 
that a legally informed understanding of the Sharing Economy—
particularly, distinguishing it from the Exchange, Gift, and Access 
Economies—is critical to an analysis of the phenomenon. Identify-
ing and delineating these economies allows us to deal with the new 
behaviors and practices facilitated by the technologies underpinning 
the PUP model. 
We have argued that the PUP model has two defining elements: 
(1) a triangular legal structure of actors and legal relationships and 
(2) an active Platform Operator. We have further argued that the P-
PUP model has two additional elements: (1) a for-profit nature and 
(2) a contractual foundation for transactions. Finally, we have ar-
gued that the TMP-PUP model has two additional elements: (1) 
monetary consideration from Users and (2) temporality in terms of 
the provision of services or access to property. 
Our analysis then differentiates the TMP-PUP model, which is 
the model that embraces those highly disruptive businesses such as 
Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit from all other types of platform-
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based transactions.161 Thus, the TMP-PUP model excludes (1) bilat-
eral transactions where Platform Operators directly provide the 
goods or services;162 (2) transactions for the provision of permanent 
or long-term services;163 (3) transactions transferring the bundle  
of rights in totum;164 (4) transactions lacking considerations;165 (5) 
transactions where the delivery of money is not an obligation of  
Users;166 (6) transactions without a profit;167 (7) transactions where 
Platforms Operators are passive actors of the structure;168 and (8) 
 
161 Other examples of firms falling within this legal structure are: DogVacay (dog 
walking services), PetCloud (pet sitting services), Eatwith (social dining services), Luxe 
(valet parking services), KitSplit (renting of cameras), LiquidSpace (renting of offices), 
ParkingPanda (renting of parking lots), and Capitalbikeshare (renting of bikes). 
162 Therefore, firms like Zipcar (from Avis Budget Group), Car2Go (from Daimler 
Group), and DriveNow (from BMW Group) are excluded from this legal structure because 
they own the car fleet rented to the public. In other words, these firms are direct providers 
of the goods to be rented. This situation is different from what happens with companies 
such as Getaround, Turo, or Drivy, where the triangular legal structure remains. Here, the 
cars rented through the platform are the ones Providers own.  
163 Therefore, firms like Seek, MeetFrank, and Workable—where matching between 
employers and job seekers is facilitated through a platform—are excluded from the TMP-
PUP model.  
164 Therefore, firms like (1) Amazon, eBay, and Craigslist (where goods are sold); (2) 
BarterDaddy, Swapub, and TradeMade (where goods are bartered); (3) Ziilch, 
LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (where goods are given away); and (4) Simbi, Listia, and 
Bunz (where goods are transferred for digital units of currency), are excluded from the 
TMP-PUP model. 
165 Therefore, firms like (1) Ziilch, LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (where the bundle of 
rights is totally transferred without consideration); (2) CouchSurfing, TrustRoots, and 
BeWelcome (where the bundle of rights over choses in possession is partially transferred 
without consideration); and (3) VolunteerMatch, KiwanisInternational, and GoVolunteer 
(where services are provided without consideration), are excluded from the TMP-PUP 
model.  
166 Therefore, firms like (1) BarterDaddy, Swapub, and TradeMade (where the 
consideration is constituted by the exchange of goods); (2) SwapRight, Swapaskill, and 
SkillsBarter (where the consideration is constituted by the exchange of services); and (3) 
Simbi, Listia, and Bunz (where digital units of currency are used rather than money), are 
excluded from the TMP-PUP model. 
167 Therefore, firms like CouchSurfing, TrustRoots, and BeWelcome (where neither 
Platform Operators nor Providers have a profit interest) are excluded from the TMP-PUP 
model.  
168 Following the explanations of the elements of the PUP model, a passive Platform 
Operator would be a firm that, despite providing an online platform for the connection of 
Providers and Users, does not shape all the legal relationships comprising the triangular 
model, such as passive message boards (e.g., craigslist, Twitter, and Instagram). See Katz, 
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transactions within the Gift Economy and, ironically, the Sharing 
Economy.169 
Using the frameworks we have provided, it is possible to differ-
entiate and organize a myriad of PUP models and transactions that 
have been erroneously categorized as part of the “Sharing Econ-
omy.” This step is crucial in addressing various ambiguities and is a 
step towards the proper regulation of these businesses. We have  
analyzed the PUP model in terms of economies and terms of  
property and contract to provide a foundation for the further subcat-
egories. In the analysis of the subclasses P-PUP and TMP-PUP 
models, new legal categories arise. We believe that the PUP and  
its subclasses should be considered as new models which, while  
facilitating transfers and transactions through technological innova-
tion, critically create a new legal structure. This new structure con-
stitutes a legal environment in which the Platform Operator sets the 
rules––often including rules of adjudication––and controls enforce-
ment. Within the PUP, the TMP-PUP model arises as a specific  
new legal category with the potential to classify highly disruptive 
business models such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit, providing a 
legal, conceptual delimitation for the analysis, understanding, and 
regulation of these models.  
 
supra note 56, at 1072 (explaining the characteristics of passive message boards and its 
differences from a direct service provider). 
169 Therefore, firms like Ziilch, LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (part of the Gift Economy) 
and CouchSurfing, TrustRoots, and BeWelcome (part of the Sharing Economy) are 
excluded from the TMP-PUP model.  
